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This paper develops an analysis of how macro-economic convergence among Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru and Chile has translated into a non-intentional institutional and constitutional 
similar order, in areas as important as fiscal and monetary stability. This current reality opens 
many possibilities for a deep financial integration and regulatory cooperation, which are 
aspects not sufficiently reflected in the Treaty and the additional Protocol. In fact, these 
instruments have followed the standard of previous Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) unde r the 
NAFTA model on financial services treatment, which does not fit adequately with the objective 
of creating a free trade zone based on the free movement of capital and financial services. An 
example of this reality is the timid development of mutual recognition of financial service 
authorizations in FTAs, contrasting the technical agenda of future developments in the Pacific 
Alliance. In that context, this paper offer some specific proposals for the peculiar institutional 
construction of the Pacific Alliance and regulatory cooperation (based on the soft law 
experience of partners and the levels of convergence already obtained) and to review eventual 
consistency problems between financial integration and other international commitments of 
partners. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The economic integration of Latin American countries is an old project conceived 
during the first years of independence from Spain. Since the Congreso Anfictiónico 
de Panamá (1826),
1 
the route to integration has been revived at different moments 
of history with varying intensity. The Andean Community (Comunidad Andina, 
CAN), the Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR), the 
Central American Integration System (Sistema de Integración Centroamericana, 
SICA), the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, 
UNASUR), and the Pacific Alliance (Alianza del Pacífico) are the contemporary 
expression of that original aspiration. 
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1 
In 1924, Simon Bolivar called to new independent republics to gather in a Congress in Panama with the 
goal of forming a Confederation of states that included defense, republic and institutional common 
commitments. 
Preferential regional commerce was in the agenda of the project of confederation, based on previous 
negotiations. Germán A. de la Reza, “El Congreso Anfictiónico de Panamá (1826). Determinaciones 
Germán 
A. de la Reza, “El Congreso Anfictiónico de Panamá (1826). Determinaciones hispanoamericanas de 
su desenlace,” pp. 189, 190, 209, Revista de Historia de América No. 134 (Jan. - Jun., 2004). See also 
Nathalie Blasco, « Présence du mythe unitaire bolivarien dans les traités d'alliance inter-latino-
américains au XIXe siècle » Caravelle (1988-) No. 85, Grandes plantations d'Amérique latine: Entre 
rêve et commerce (Décembre 2005), pp. 185-204. 
3  
And even if Latin American regionalism over the last twenty years has moved mostly 
towards economic liberalization under an “open regionalism,”2 this tendency has not been 
accompanied by a supranational institutional arrangement equivalent to the European 
Union.
3 
From the perspective of international economic law history, it is interesting that the 
absence of such an institutional arrangement has not prevented a substantial level of 
macroeconomic convergence —under soft law mechanisms—4 among countries like 
Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile. This is precisely the point of departure of the economic 
integration process under the Pacific Alliance; i.e., the establishment of an area of regional 
integration,
5 
in the Framework Agreement, with the explicit objective of building “a zone 
of deep integration to develop progressively the free circulation of goods, services, capitals 
and persons.
6
 
 
Macroeconomic convergence among Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile has translated into 
a similar nonintentional constitutional order in areas as important as fiscal and monetary 
stability  (principles  of  fiscal  responsibility  and  central  bank  independence),  financial 
integration, and regulatory cooperation, which are not reflected sufficiently in the 
Framework Agreement and the Additional Protocol.
7 
In fact, these instruments have 
followed the standard texts of previous Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) under the North 
 
 
2 
The term open regionalism (« regionalismo abierto ») is employed in the second paragraph of the Preamble 
of the Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance as follows : “Decided to strengthen the different 
integration schemes in Latin America, as spaces of accordance and convergence, oriented to promote the 
open regionalism that efficiently insert all the parties in the globalized world and interrelate them other 
initiatives of regionalization” (unofficial translation based also in analogous texts of Free Trade Agreements 
as all of the reference to Pacific Alliance instruments). See reference to L. Burgorgue – Larsen, « Le Fait 
Régional dans la Juridictionnalisation du Droit International » in SFDI, La juridictionnalisation du droit 
international, Paris, Pedone, 2003 in « La Jurisprudence des Tribunaux des Organisations d’Intégration 
Latino-Américaines », Annuaire Français de Droit International LI – 2005 – CNRS Éditions, Paris, pp. 633 - 
634 (Chronique coordonée par Patrick Daillier, Myriam Benlolo-Carabot, Nadine Susani, Anne-laure Vaurs- 
Chaumette, Chronique No 1). 
3 
See a comparative reflection between the European Union and the Latin American liberalization in Manuel 
Monteagudo, “Construcción europea y liberalización económica en América Latina: desafíos comunes en la 
evolución del Derecho internacional económico,” Cuadernos europeos de Deusto, No 43 (España, 2010). 
4 
See some examples of the use of soft Law in Latin America in Manuel Monteagudo, “Evolución del 
Derecho Internacional Económico en América Latina: ¿la Liberalización es solo Económica? en “Estado y 
Futuro del Derecho Económico Internacional en América Latina,” pp. 75-87 (Universidad Externado de 
Colombia, 2013). 
5 
Article 1 of the Pacific Alliance first Treaty and in Spanish, “Acuerdo Marco de la Alianza del Pacífico,” 
signed on June 6, 2012 (already ratified by county members). We will refer it as the Framework Agreement. 
6 
Article 3.1 (a) of the Framework Agreement. 
7 
In Spanish the additional Protocol is called, “Protocolo adicional al Acuerdo Marco de la Alianza del 
Pacífico” and it was signed on February 10, 2014 (already ratified by county members) 
4  
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) model on financial services treatment, which 
does not necessarily imply the creation of full financial integration mirroring the European 
common market. Aspects like mutual recognition as a pivotal element for banking 
integration are only established in general terms;
8 
and regulatory exceptions for prudential, 
monetary, and exchange purposes are established following the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and FTA models.
9
 
 
Thus, the timid development of international instruments under the Pacific Alliance has 
been overcome by initiatives that are well justified in a relatively homogeneous group of 
countries, like the integration of local stock exchanges (Mercado Integrado 
Latinoamericano, MILA), arranged by private participants and fully supported by 
local regulators. In fact, MILA has already pressed for some regulatory convergence and 
mutual recognition, showing the possibilities of deeper financial integration like in the 
European 
Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In fact, at some levels, 
ASEAN departed from a lower stage of integration than Latin America.
10
 
 
As a result of economic liberalization under stabilization programs promoted by 
international economic organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), among others, Pacific 
Alliance members considerably open to the world economy without having developed 
specific mechanisms for financial integration in Latin America; and the problem now is 
that, after the recent financial global crisis, several global banks have withdrawn from the 
region
11 
and no major European or American banks have filled the void.
12 
In general, even 
 
 
 
8 
Article 11.2 of the Additional Protocol of the Pacific Alliance 
9 
Article 11.1 the Additional Protocol of the Pacific Alliance 
10 “Except for the financial centers of Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, the degree of financial integration of 
many Asian economies is below the level predicted by the model for all economies, and in several cases falls 
behind the norm for Latin America and Eastern Europe.” Geert Almekinders, Satoshi Fukuda, Alex 
Mourmouras, Jianping Zhou, “ASEAN Financial Integration,” p. 8, IMF Working paper WP/15/34 (February 
2015) 
11 
Luc Eyraud, Diva Singh, and Bennett Sutton, 5 “Benefits of Global and Regional Financial Integration in 
Latin  America,”  (IMF  Working  PaperWestern  Hemisphere  Department,  January  2017).  Bilateral  and 
multilateral initiatives to increase the transparency of the international financial system have also contributed 
to a loss of correspondent banks in Latin America. U.S. agencies’ enforcement actions against breaches of 
compliance with domestic regulations on trade and economic sanctions, tax evasion, and anti-money 
5  
laundering/combating the financing of terrorism, as well as other post-global financial crisis developments, 
6  
Latin American banking systems that are not strongly integrated have recently built tight 
links with advanced economy banking systems, from which shocks may emanate.
13 
Peru and 
Chile, for example, offer a relatively high degree of global openness that is offset by the 
lack of regional integration of their respective financial markets.
14
 
 
This article highlights the institutional convergence that Pacific Alliance members have 
reached in monetary and fiscal policies, in contrast with the general principles of financial 
integration provided by the treaty instruments and local legislation (section I). An analysis 
is also proposed of some major elements of financial integration focused on the banking 
sector, in order to identify some consistency problems of the legal framework of the Pacific 
Alliance and suggest solutions for the future agenda (section II). 
 
The high degree of macroeconomic convergence of Pacific Alliance members in some 
aspects can be considered a starting point that is significantly more developed than the 
initial stages of the Single Market Program (SMP) in banking and financial services (1992) 
in the European Union. Gardener, Molyneux, Mooere and Winters point out that prior to 
start of the SMP the regulatory structure and competitive environment of European 
banking and financial system resembled, to varying degrees, those of many developing 
countries, including low banking standards in key areas like credit risk appraisal and loan 
management, weak prudential supervision, and weak internal controls and risk 
management.
15 
Today, many Latin American countries, especially the Pacific Alliance 
members,  are  well  in  the  path  of  Basel  Committee  standards,  although  with  some 
 
 
 
have led international banks operating under US regulations to withdraw from activities seen as high risk. 
Iulia Ruxandra Teodoru, “Barriers to Integration in Banking in IMF, 53, “Financial Integration in Latin 
America, a New Strategy for a New Normal (Ch. Enoch, W, Bossu, C. Caceres and D. Singh eds. 2017). 
12 
Id. at ix. 
13 
IMF, “Financial Integration in Latin America” 32 (Staff Report, March 2016). “Bank linkages with 
advanced economies outside the region—in particular, Canada, Spain, UK, and the United States—are 
relatively important… an asset-side shock to these advanced economies’ banking systems could have a 
sizeable impact on the availability of foreign credit to Latin American countries. A shock to any of the Latin 
American banking systems would likely have small direct spillovers on to other countries in the region due to 
limited intraregional cross-border banking exposures.” Ibid. 
14
See Luc Eyraud, Diva Singh, and Bennett Sutton, Supra note 11 at 15. 
15 
E.P.M. Gardener, P. Molyneux, B. Moore and L.A. Winters, “The Impact of the Single Market Programme 
on EU Banking: Select Policy Experiences for developing Countries,” pp. 236 – 237  in World Trade 
Organization and World Bank, The Internationalization of Financial Services – Issues and Lessons for 
Developing Countries (S. Claessens and M. Jansen eds.) 2000 Kluwer Law International 
7  
differences in the speed of implementation,
16 
showing relative robustness and resilience 
after the last global financial crisis
17 
and creating an environment for the integration of 
financial markets that can permit regional banks to cover the space left by global banks. 
The financial crisis and the increased regulatory oversight have led some global institutions 
to reduce their cross-border activities and pull back into their core markets.
18 
The Latin 
America economic space is now in front of a new opportunity to evolve. 
 
I. Living an extraordinary momentum for convergence in institutional economics? 
 
 
Pacific Alliance members have reached such an extraordinary level of macroeconomic 
convergence that one could imagine that the Framework Agreement and the Additional 
Protocol should have produced more explicit commitments on financial integration. 
Average inflation in the 1980s was 1421% in Peru, 70% in Mexico, 24 % in Colombia, and 
22% in Chile. In contrast, the overall average inflation at the end of 2015 was just 3.6%. On 
the fiscal front, after a period of structural fiscal deficits in the 1980s, at the end of 2015 the 
overall average was - 3.1 %.
19  
The debt problem of the 1980s has also been overcome. 
Chile’s public debt was 77% of GDP in 1990, 20 and around 16% in 2015. Peru’s 
experience was similar, with its debt ratio dropping from 56% in 1990 to 31.6% in 2015 
(far lower than in the European Union or the U.S).
21 
External robustness is also reflected in 
the level of international reserves, which as of 2015 had multiplied by 15 from an average 
of US $5.4 billion in 1990.
22 
The region’s overall macroeconomic stability is reinforced by 
 
 
 
 
16 
Brazil and Mexico lead the region in the implementation of Basel III, closely following the international 
timeline. Peru is next, while Chile and Colombia have taken a more gradual approach. Colombia has 
enhanced its capital measure, bringing it closer to the Basel III definition. Iulia Ruxandra Teodoru, “Barriers 
to Integration in Banking in IMF, “Financial Integration in Latin America Supra Note 11 at 52. 
17
R. Lastra and E. Cendeño-Brea, “Latin American Financial Reform,” 25 (manuscript 2012). 
18 
Luc Eyraud, Diva Singh, and Bennett Sutton, Supra Note 11 at 23. 
19 
According to last IMF Article IV reports the deficit fiscal in Mexico is estimated 1.8% (2017), in Colombia 
reported 1.6% (2015), in Peru estimated 1.4% (2017) and in Chile reported 1.7% (2015). 
20
Alexandre Tombini, Rodrigo Vergara and Julio Velarde, “Growth, Stability, and Prosperity in Latin 
America,” 29 (Group of thirty Occasional Paper No. 91, October 2015) 
21 
According to last IMF Article IV reports the ratio public debt/GDP in Mexico was reported 58.4% (2016), 
Colombia 39.7% (2015), Peru 31.6% (2016) and Chile 19% (2015) 
22 
According to last IMF Article IV reports international reserves of Mexico has been estimated in US $ 212 
billion (2017), Colombia US $ 114 billion (2015), Peru US $ 62.1 billion (2017), and Chile US $51.288 
billion. 
8  
its high degree of openness and the number of FTAs signed with the world’s main actors 
(the U.S., the EU, Japan, and China). 
 
Monetary and fiscal stability, already sound in the Pacific Alliance region, is considered 
one of the most effective engines for financial integration. Financial integration and the 
building of a common capital market in the European Union, as a new stage of integration, 
followed the consolidation of monetary stability through the European Monetary System 
and frequent calls for unifying principles on fiscal responsibility.
23 
However, the peculiarity 
of this process among Pacific Alliance members is the fact that macroeconomic figures 
have been translated into constitutional and legal principles in each member, following the 
implementation of international standards from the international economic organizations 
where  they  are  developing  an  active  engagement.  As  in  the  monetary  domain,  the 
harmonization of fiscal rules under international standards or common rules is a decisive 
point in economic integration.
24 
However, even though Pacific Alliance treaty instruments 
were negotiated in this converging context, they follow generalities that are already 
established in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and FTAs signed by 
member countries with third parties, rather than providing specific guidelines for financial 
integration. 
 
a. Institutional (Monetary and Fiscal) Convergence of the Pacific Alliance in the Era 
of Soft Law 
 
As part of the worldwide trend towards ensuring central bank independence,
25 
since the end 
of the 1980s many Latin American countries amended their central banks’ legislation in 
 
 
 
23
An important lesson that has emerged from Europe is that monetary and financial integration without fiscal 
or political integration is fraught with danger, especially when member countries are highly heterogeneous in 
terms of fiscal discipline, export competitiveness, institutional advancement, and other macrocritical 
dimensions. Geert Almekinders, Satoshi Fukuda, Alex Mourmouras, Jianping Zhou, Supra note 10 at 26. 
24  
See E. Baltensperger and N. Herger in “Development and Stability in the Nexus between Trade and 
Finance”, The prospects of International Trade Regulation, from Fragmentation to Coherence, p. 412 (T. 
Cottier & P. Delimatsis) (Cambridge 2011). 
25 
M. Monteagudo, Neutrality of Money and Central Bank Independence, in International Monetary and 
Financial Law the Global Crisis, p. 495 (Oxford University Press, UK, 2010). See also generally MANUEL 
MONTEAGUDO, LA INDEPENDENCIA DEL BANCO CENTRAL, 311-14 (Banco Central de Reserva del 
Perú, Universidad del Pacífico and Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2010). 
9  
order to consecrate monetary stability as their main goal, as well as governance 
independence, independence in the conduct of monetary policy, prohibition or limitations 
to finance the government, and accountability. This general trend was followed by Chile 
(1989), El Salvador (1991), Argentina (1992 and 2002), Colombia (1992), Jamaica (1992), 
Nicaragua (1992 and 1999), Venezuela (1992 and 1999), Ecuador (1992 and 1998), Peru 
(1993), Mexico (1993), Bolivia (1995), Costa Rica (1995), Uruguay (1995), Paraguay 
(1995),  Honduras  (1996  and  2004),  Guatemala  (2001),  and  the  Dominican  Republic 
(2002).
26
 
 
In fact, a decisive legal aspect of central bank independence is the fact that its consecration 
is recognized at the constitutional level as part of the rule of law. That is the original 
conception of the social market economy in the 1920s —also known as the German 
ordoliberalism— which places monetary stability and central bank independence as pillars 
of the economic constitution.
27  
In terms of the distribution of State’s power attributions, 
central bank independence implies a separation of powers
28  
because sovereign attributes 
(monetary powers) are attributed in favor of a public body which is not part of the 
government. In this line of thought, the Constitutional Tribunal of France, following the 
French centralized administrative tradition, understood in 1993 that the European central 
bank independence recognized by the Maastricht Treaty should imply an amendment of its 
constitutional regime.
29 
And in countries like the U.S., even though central bank 
independence is not expressly established by the Federal Constitution, public opinion fully 
supports that status as part of the U.S. economic order.
30  
The expressed recognition of 
 
 
26 
Id. at pp. 26-27 and also Committee on International Monetary Law (MOCOMILA), Report for the 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION (WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 2014) in http://www.mothe 
European   Constitution   comila.org/publication/2014-mocomila-washington-report.pdf 
27 
See more about the German ordoliberalism in MANUEL MONTEAGUDO Supra note 25 at pp. 353-368. 
Social Market economy is referred by Article 3.3 of the European Union Treaty (as it is the case of article I-3 
of the non-approved texts European Constitution. 
28 
Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens (1789) established that every society in 
which the guarantee of rights is not secured and the separation of powers is not clear does not have a 
Constitution. 
29 
Decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel of 9th April 1993 (JPC, 92, 2, 21853) 
30“It appears safe to say, for example, that the US Federal Reserve Board, although not part of the explicit 
constitution, is sufficiently embedded in American life to have a constitution- like statutes, in the sense that, 
absent economic disaster, any attempt significantly to reduce the independence of the Fed would be 
politically unthinkable. In an environment of illegal or arbitrary extractions, there is little benefit to a 
guarantee of price-level stability since no political deal has durability in any event.” MILLER G.P., "An 
10  
central bank independence by national constitutions in countries with a civil law tradition 
—as in the case of Pacific Alliance members— is a necessary condition to make them 
operate efficiently. Classical political bodies (Congress and Government) are confined to 
modifying or restricting central bank independence if their basic elements are clearly 
identified in the Constitution, constitutional or organic laws, and even in jurisprudence. 
 
The Constitutions of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile recognize generally the principle 
of central bank independence and provide specific limitations or prohibitions on credit to 
the government. Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution establishes that the State shall have 
a central bank that shall be autonomous for the exercise of its functions and management. 
Its prior goal shall be to promote stability of purchasing power of national currency, 
strengthening by this way the national development in charge of the State. None authority 
shall mandate the bank to accord financing. In the case of Colombia, article 371 of the 
Constitution establishes that the Bank of the Republic shall perform central bank functions. 
It will be organized as a moral person of public law, with administrative, patrimonial and 
technical autonomy under its own legal regime, and regarding the credit to the government 
article 373 disposes that Credit operations in favor to the government shall require the 
unanimity of Board members unless the case of open market operations. In no case 
Congress will mandate quotas of credits in favor of the State or private persons. The 
Peruvian and Chilean Constitutions follow the same pattern with even more restrictions on 
credit. Article 84 of the Peruvian Constitution establishes that the Central Bank is a moral 
person of public law. It enjoys autonomy according to its organic law… The Bank is 
prohibited to accord credit to the Treasury, with the exception of the purchase in the 
secondary market of Treasury bills subject to the limits established in its organic law.” 
According to article 108 of the Chilean Constitution, it shall exist an autonomous organism 
with own patrimony, technical character, named central bank, whose composition, 
organization, functions and powers shall be determined by a constitutional organic law, 
and article 109 that no public expense or loan shall be financed by direct or indirect loans 
the central bank. Despite that, in case of external war or the risk of it as qualified by the 
 
 
 
Interest-Group Theory of central bank independence", Chicago: The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. XXVII(2), 
June 1998, p. 451. 
11  
National Security Board, the Bank will be able to obtain, accord or finance credits to the 
State and public or private entities. 
 
Even though constitutional texts show some differences, they are evidence of a significant 
level of constitutional convergence.
31 
The principle of autonomy or independence is well 
established; and in countries like Colombia, where the Board of Directors of the central 
bank is led by the Ministry of Finance;
32 
the Constitutional Tribunal has reaffirmed central 
bank independence on different occasions. One of the most significant decisions was 
reached in 1993, when the Tribunal stated that the Banco de la República is a body created 
for the service of the functional imperative of ensuring a “healthy” currency, and therefore 
free from political influence and not part of the government.
33
 
 
On fiscal stability and responsibility, since the end of the 1990s Latin America has 
followed a similar approach to central bank independence, introducing specific legislation 
on fiscal transparency and responsibility, including limits on the fiscal deficit and public 
debt under the IMF code of Best Practices on Fiscal Transparency, first published in 1998 
and modified in 2007 and 2014.
34 
By 2007 almost all Latin American countries (with the 
exception of the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Bolivia) had performed assessments 
under the IMF code of Fiscal Transparency.
35
 
 
Pacific Alliance country members are not an exception to the trend on fiscal 
responsibility.
36  
In 2006 Mexico approved the Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility 
 
 
 
31 
Chile and Peru rank among the most de jure independent central banks in the emerging markets’ world. L. 
I. Jácome, E. W. Nier and P. Iman, “Building Blocks for Effective Macroprudential Policies in Latin 
America: Institutional Considerations,” p. 18 IMF Working Paper (July 2012). The reform towards central 
bank independence in Latin America has been an evolving process. In 2003, after the reform of central bank 
legislation, the work of Laurens, Arnone and Segalotto on central bank independence ranked already the 
central banks of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile among the group of countries with medium score of 
independence. B. Laurents, M. Arnone and J-F Segalotto, “Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and 
Transparency (IMF 2009). 
32
Article 28 of the Law No 31, Law of the Banco de la República 
33  
Paragraph 12 of the Constitutional Tribunal Decision of November 11, 1993. 
34 
The IMF code was updated in 2007 See current version of the IMF code of Best Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency in http://blog-pfm.imf.org/files/ft-code.pdf 
35 
T. Parry, “The Role of Fiscal Transparency in Sustaining Growth and Stability in Latin America, ”IMF 
Working Paper 07/220, p. 4 (2007) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07220.pdf) 
36 
Committee on International Monetary Law (MOCOMILA), Supra note 26. 
12  
Law
37 
with a zero fiscal target for the public sector balance and the principle that the annual 
budget law must provide macroeconomic forecasts and fiscal objectives. Colombia, 
although already having a Semaphore Law since 1997,
38 
approved Law 819 (Organic 
Budget Rules for Fiscal Transparency and Macroeconomic Stability) in 2003,
39 
which 
established a fiscal surplus target, limits to the public debt, and a medium-term 
macroeconomic framework.
40 
The constitutional reform of 2011 provided the principle of 
fiscal sustainability and a fiscal rule.
41 
Peru approved the Law on Fiscal Prudence and 
Transparency in 1999
42 
(amended in 2003, 2007, 2013, 2016 and 2017).
43 
The current 
regime establishes that total public debt shall not be more than 30% of the GDP and a fiscal 
deficit target (below 1% of GDP).
44 
The law establishes a medium-term macroeconomic 
framework, as well as limits on the deficit, borrowing of sub-national governments, and 
spending during election years. Chile, considered one of the most fiscally transparent 
countries in the world even before the regional reforms,
45 
approved in 2006 the Fiscal 
Transparency and Responsibility Law,
46 
following the recommendations of international 
organizations (IMF, IDB, WB and the OECD). 
47
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
Law published on March 30
th 
2006 and amended in 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2015. 
38 
Law No. 358 1997 (published on February 4
th 
1997) 
39 
Law No. 819 (July 9
th 
2003). 
40 
See “Fiscal policy, public debt and monetary policy in emerging market economies,” p. 12 (BIS Papers No 
67 Monetary and Economic Department, October 2012) 
41
The new version of Article 334 of Colombian Constitution provides principle of fiscal sustainability for any 
public action executed to reach public objectives (La dirección general de la economía estará a cargo del 
Estado. Este intervendrá, por mandato de la ley, en la explotación de los recursos naturales, en el uso del 
suelo, en la producción, distribución, utilización y consumo de los bienes, y en los servicios públicos y 
privados, para racionalizar la economía con el fin de conseguir en el plano nacional y territorial, en un 
marco de sostenibilidad fiscal, el mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de los habitantes, la distribución 
equitativa de las oportunidades y los beneficios del desarrollo y la preservación de un ambiente sano. Dicho 
marco de sostenibilidad fiscal deberá fungir como instrumento para alcanzar de manera progresiva los 
objetivos del Estado Social de Derecho. En cualquier caso el gasto público social será prioritario. (…) La 
sostenibilidad fiscal debe orientar a las Ramas y Órganos del Poder Público, dentro de sus competencias, en 
un marco de colaboración armónica. (…)) 
42 
Law No. 27245 
43 
Laws Nos. 27958, 29144, 30099, Decree Legislative No. 1276 and Law 30680. 
44 
Articles 6.1a) and 6.1b) of the Decree Legislative No. 1276. 
45
Manuel  Monteagudo,  “Evolución  del  Derecho  Internacional  Económico  en  América  Latina:  ¿la 
Liberalización es solo Económica?, Supra note 4 at pp. 80 – 81. 
46 
Law No. 20128 published on 30 September 2006. 
47 
Press release of the Ministry of Finance of September 28, 2005 in http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/articles- 
21088_recurso_1.pdf 
13  
Monetary and fiscal stability and transparency are only part of a larger convergence in 
public policy aspects of Pacific Alliance country members. As mentioned, this process has 
been promoted from classical international economic organization (the IMF and the World 
Bank) that led stabilization programs in these countries through the implementation of IMF 
facilities,
48 
and also under the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) for the 
surveillance of financial stability and development.
49
 
 
Besides that, Pacific Alliance country members have also engaged in less universal 
institutions and international regulatory associations. For example, Mexico and Chile are 
already members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD),
50 
and Colombia and Peru have initiated their respective adherence processes.
51
All 
of the central banks from Pacific Alliance countries have become members of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) since the end of the 1990s,
52 
and they are also active 
participants of soft law creators such as the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO);
53 
the EGMONT group of Financial Intelligence Units;
54 
the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF – GAFI), established to set standards and promote 
effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating 
money laundering, financing of terrorism and other related threats to the integrity of the 
international financial system;
55  
the International Federation of Accountants (IFA);
56  
the 
 
 
 
48 
Mexico had an IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1989 and two IMF Stand-By Facilities in 1995 and 
1999. Colombia had an EFF in 1999 and SBA in 2003 (precautionary). Peru had three SBAs in 1989, 1996 
and 1999 (being precautionary in 1996 and 1999) and two precautionary SBA in 2001 and 2002. Chile had a 
SBA in 1989. See Table 2.5 IMF arrangements in Latin America 1989 – 2004 in IMF. See, Anoop Singh, 
Agnès Belaisch, Charles Collyns, Paula De Masi, Reva Krieger, Guy Meredith, and Robert Rennhack, 15 
(Table 2.5) “Stabilization and Reform in Latin America: A Macroeconomic Perspective on the Experience 
Since the Early 1990s” (IMF, February 2005) 
49 
FSAPs analyze the resilience of the financial sector, the quality of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework, and the capacity to manage and resolve financial crises. Based on its findings, FSAPs produce 
recommendations of a micro- and macro-prudential nature, tailored to country-specific circumstances. See 
FSAP’s content and objectives in http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx. The last FSAP’s reports on 
each Pacific Alliance country members 
50 
Mexico since May 18th 1994 and Chile May 7h,2010 
51 
Peru was formally invite don May 7
th 
2014 and Colombia initiated its process on May 29
th 
2013. 
52 
Mexico on November 1996, Chile on May 2005, Peru on June 2011 and Colombia on 2011. See reference 
in BIS Press release, “BIS invites new members” 26 June 2011 (https://www.bis.org/press/p110626a.htm) 
53 
See in https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=membership_map 
54 
See in https://www.egmontgroup.org/en/membership/list 
55 
See in http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/ 
56 
Se in https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership 
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International Accounting Standards Board (IASB);
57 
the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers (IADI);
58 
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS).
59
 
 
This machinery of global standardization has served to create a positive environment for 
the economic integration of a group of countries that share a clear identification with the 
international economic system. As mentioned, looking at the European experience, Latin 
America and the Pacific Alliance have developed their “own way” to harmonize financial 
regulations and practices without resorting to a supranational authority. In that context, the 
presence of Mexico in the Financial Stability Board (FSB) following the enlargement of its 
structure in 2008 at the time of the international financial crisis, offers a great opportunity 
to Pacific Alliance country members for communicating with this influential organization
60
 
to deepening their financial integration process. 
 
 
Convergence in monetary stability and fiscal responsibility are basic premises for making 
progress towards financial integration if we —once again— take the European experience 
as a recent historical reference. In the European Union, monetary unification was a decisive 
phase that ushered in new processes like the banking and capital market union; but 
limitations and asymmetries in fiscal responsibility principles have delayed the European 
process in many instances.
61 
Thus, the Pacific Alliance should take full advantage of the 
institutional convergence already gained regarding these two premises. 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
See in http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/ 
58 
Mexico, Colombia and Peru are members of IADI. See in http://www.iadi.org/en/about-iadi/iadi-members- 
and-participants/list-of-members/ 
59 
See in http://www.iaisweb.org/page/about-the-iais/iais-members 
60 
The FSB has become the most important mechanisms “for national authorities, standard setting bodies and 
international financial institutions to address vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regulatory, 
supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stability.” Source (legal documents and JIEL article) 
See also http://www.fsb.org/about/history/ 
61 
Precisely the EU response to the international financial crisis that started in 2007 included a package of 
stricter fiscal rules to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact. See an illustrative summary of EU context 
and fiscal measures in René Smits, “The Crisis Response in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: 
overview of legal developments,” pp. 8-29 (Working Paper Series 2015 – 01 of the Amsterdam Centre for 
European Law and Governance) (submitted to Fordham Journal of International Law) 
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b. Is the goal of creating a deep Financial Integration Area in the Pacific Alliance 
realistic? 
 
The Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance is ambitious in formulating the horizon 
of the integration project when we consider some paragraphs of its Preamble. They refer to 
the Presidential Declaration of April 28, 2011, which established “an area of deep 
integration in search for the progressive development of the free movement of goods, 
services, capitals and persons”62 and having as initial base or point of departure “all of the 
economic, commercial and integration agreements already signed by country members at 
the bilateral, regional and multilateral level.”63 Therefore, article 3 of Framework 
Agreement consecrates the explicit goal of “building, in a participative and consensual 
way, an integrated area”64 and commits, among their respective implementing actions, to 
“liberalize the exchange of goods and services, in light to consolidate a free trade zone 
among the parties.” Article 1.1 of the Additional Protocol also provides explicitly that 
country members of the Pacific Alliance create a free trade zone, with the sense of article 
XXIV of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and article V of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that permit WTO members to deviate from their 
treaty obligations as a result of having entered into FTAs, provided that they establish a 
significant degree of economic integration.
65 
These provisions offer the possibility to 
achieve a higher degree of regional openness without automatically granting similar 
treatment to the rest of WTO members, a possibility that has not been used extensively in 
Latin American FTAs.
66 
However, the Pacific Alliance should not be conceived as a mere 
liberalization of national economies, but a process in which such liberalization is a vehicle 
for building an area of deep integration. The term “deep integration” used in Pacific 
Alliance treaties implies an ambition that goes beyond the liberalization stage already 
provided in FTAs or commercial agreements. 
 
 
 
62 
Paragraph 2 of the Preamble of the Framework Agreement. 
63 
Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the Framework Agreement 
64 
Objective 1.a provided in article 3 of the Framework Agreement. 
65  
M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum, P. C. Mavroidis & M. Hahn, “The World Trade Organization Law, 
Practice and Policy” p. 373 (Third Edition, 2015), The Oxford International Law Library 
66  
L. Lorenzo & W. Bossu, “ Legal Barriers to Regional Financial Integration in Latin America” in Latin 
America, A New Strategy for a New Normal,” 109, (Ch. Enoch, W, Bossu, C. Caceres and D. Singh eds. 
16  
If we look at the European common market as one of the most advanced experiences in 
“deep integration” of the financial sector, we can identify that the high level of regulatory 
harmonization and mutual recognition of licenses of local regulators are pivotal elements in 
its construction. In assessing financial integration in the ASEAN, the lack of mutual 
recognition and common disclosure requirements are also standing in the way of the 
creation of a common market. In this regard it is important to note that the AEC Blueprint 
calls for regulatory harmonization and the strengthening of policy coordination among 
member states.
67  
However, despite the “deep integration” goal enunciated in treaties, the 
Additional Protocol of the Pacific Alliance develops both pivotal elements, almost 
mirroring the texts of the FTAs under the NAFTA model, which do not have the same goal 
and perspective. As mentioned, the Framework Agreement recognizes in its Preamble that 
previous economic, commercial and integration agreements are the base for the integration 
process, meaning that they should be understood as a point of departure and not of arrival. 
 
Chapter 11 of the Additional Protocol is devoted to financial services and most of its 
articles cover similar topics with similar language to the NAFTA model, which is not 
precisely an initiative for deep integration or even a common market, like previous U.S. 
initiatives.
68 
Article 11.1 starts defining financial services with a large list of financial, 
banking and insurance activities; Article 11.2 determines the scope of its application to 
measures adopted or maintained by member countries regarding: a) financial institutions of 
another Party, b) investors of another Party, and investments of such investors, in financial 
institutions in the Party’s territory, and c) cross-border trade in financial services; and 
articles 11.3 and 11.4 recognize National Treatment and the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) 
Treatment, respectively. Article 11.6 refers to cross-border trade but limited —as in the 
 
 
 
 
67 
Geert Almekinders, Satoshi Fukuda, Alex Mourmouras, Jianping Zhou, Supra note 
68 
The adoption of the NAFTA must be seen against the background of several initiatives undertaken during 
the past four decades to increase US involvement in hemispheric integration, with the ultimate goal of 
achieving free trade but stopping well short of any “common market” commitment. Initiatives such as the 
Alliance for Progress, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative bear 
witness to the increasing recognition, by a succession of US Presidents, that elimination of cross-border 
obstacles to trade among American states would be beneficial. M. Van Empel and A. Mörner, “Financial 
Services and Regional Integration,” 51 in World Trade Organization and World Bank, The 
Internationalization of Financial Services – Issues and Lessons for Developing Countries (S. Claessens and 
M. Jansen eds.) 2000 Kluwer Law International. 
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case of the FTA between Peru and the US—69 to the provision and transfer of financial 
information and financial data processing and related software and advisory and other 
auxiliary financial services, excluding intermediation, relating to banking and other 
financial services. In this case, the treaty obligation does not require a Party to permit such 
suppliers to do business or solicit in its territory. The rest of articles of Chapter 11 also 
follow the basic structure of the NAFTA model.
70
 
 
In order to verify the degree of development of regulatory harmonization and mutual 
recognition in Pacific Alliance instruments, it is very illustrative to pay attention to those 
Articles of Chapter 11 that, following the NAFTA model, although with slight differences, 
refer to local legislation. Article 11.5 provides that any Party shall permit an investor of 
another Party to establish under its territory a financial institution under any of the types of 
establishment  and  operation  that  its  [local]  legislation  permits  at  the  time  of  the 
establishment, without the imposition of quantity restrictions or specific requirements 
provided by law. 
71 
Article 11.11 related to “Exceptions” contains the following provisions: 
 
1. Nothing established in the Additional Protocol shall be interpreted in the sense that 
any Party may be impeded to adopt or maintain for prudential reasons, measures 
such as: (a) the protection of investors, depositors, policy-holders or persons to 
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial institution or cross-border financial 
service supplier; (b) the maintenance of financial security, solvency, integrity or 
responsibility of financial institutions individually and cross-border financial 
service supplier, or (c) to guaranty the integrity and stability of the financial system. 
 
 
 
69 
Article 12.5.1 of the FTA signed between Peru and the US. 
70  
Right to establishment (Article 11.5), Cross-Border Trade (article 11.6), New Financial Services (article 
11.7), Treatment of Certain Information (article 11.8) , Senior Management and Boards of Directors (article 
11.9), Non-Conforming Measures (article 11.10), Exceptions (Article 11.11), Recognition and Harmonization 
(Article 11. 12), Transparency and Administration of Certain Measures (article 11.13), Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (article 11.14), Payment and Clearing Systems (article 11.15), Specific Commitments(article 
11.16) , Data Processing (article 11.17), Financial Services Committee (article 11.18), Consultations (article 
11.19), Dispute Settlement (article 11.20) and Investment Disputes in Financial Services (article 11.21). It 
should be noted that Recognition and Harmonization is provided in the FTA signed by Peru and the US in 
Article 12.3 referred to Most-Favored-Nation Treatment. (following the FTA between the US and Peru) 
71 
This rule is not provided in the same terms in FTA signed by Peru and the US See Article 12.4 and 
investment (Investment Chapter). 
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Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of this Additional 
Protocol, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Party’s commitments or 
obligations under such provisions. 
 
2. Nothing in this Additional Protocol applies to non-discriminatory measures of 
general application taken by any public entity in pursuit of monetary and related 
credit or exchange rate policies. This paragraph shall not affect a Party’s 
obligations under Article 10.8 (Performance Requirements) with respect to 
measures covered by Chapter Ten (Investment) or under Article 10.11 (Transfers) 
or 9.13 (Transfers and Payments). 
 
3. Notwithstanding what is established in Article 10.11 (Transfers) and Article 9.13 
(Transfers and Payments), as incorporated into this Chapter, a Party may prevent 
or limit transfers by a financial institution or cross-border financial service supplier 
to, or for the benefit of, an affiliate of or person related to such institution or 
supplier, through the equitable, non-discriminatory, and good faith application of 
measures relating to maintenance of the safety, soundness, solvency, integrity, or 
financial responsibility of financial institutions or cross-border financial service 
suppliers. This paragraph does not prejudice any other provision of this Agreement 
that permits a Party to restrict transfers. 
 
4. For greater certainty, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures necessary to secure compliance 
with laws or regulations that are not inconsistent with this Chapter, including those 
relating to the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the 
effects of a default on financial services contracts, subject to the requirement that 
such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on investment in financial institutions or cross- 
border trade in financial services, as they are covered by this Chapter. 
19  
 
The four paragraphs of article 11.11 emphasize the capacity of country members to impose 
measures
72 
that, under certain conditions, may remain immune from the integration 
commitments provided by treaties. Those measures are related to prudential reasons, 
monetary and related credit or exchange policies and the prevention or limitation of 
transfers for the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial responsibility 
of financial institutions or cross-border financial service suppliers. In sum, the exceptions 
provided by article 11.11 cover any legislative and regulatory and operational action from 
local political bodies, banking and financial regulators and supervisors and central banks. It 
is interesting that the reserve of national legal and regulatory capacity is almost equal to the 
one provided in FTAs under the NAFTA model,
73 
and is inspired by the so called Carve- 
Out exception already provided in Paragraph 2 (a) of the Annex on Financial Services of 
the GATS (1994), as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a 
Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for 
the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system. Where such measures do not conform with provisions of the Agreement, 
they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations 
under the Agreement. (…).” 
 
It must be recalled that in the context of negotiations of GATT instruments, financial 
regulators tried to assure its capacity to regulate financial markets within the system of 
multilateral rules that should remove –universally- any restriction to international trade. 
“[w]hen the idea of including financial services in the Uruguay Round was first proposed, 
financial regulators were concerned about the possibility of a trade agreement interfering 
with their ability to regulate and supervise financial institutions. They made it clear that the 
 
 
72 
According to GATS Article XXVIII (a), ‘measure’ is broadly defined as ‘any measure by a Member, 
whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form.’ 
And according to GATS Article XXVIII (c), it includes, inter alia, ‘measures in respect of: (i) the purchase, 
payment or use of a service; (ii) the access to and use of, in connection with the supply of a service, services 
which are required by those members to be offered to the public generally; and (iii) the presence, including 
commercial presence, of persons of a Member for the supply of a service in the territory of another Member.’ 
M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum, P. C. Mavroidis & M. Hahn, Supra note 65 at p. 564. 
73 
Article 12.10 of the FTA signed by Peru and the US. 
20  
inclusion of financial services in the GATS would be unacceptable without a specific 
exception for prudential regulation and supervision. As a result, the GATS would be 
unacceptable without a specific prudential carve-out to ensure that the opening of markets 
that the agreement is intended to achieve will not jeopardize prudential regulation and 
supervision. Now, it is taken for granted by everyone involved that such a provision is 
necessary whenever financial services are included in an international trade or investment 
agreement.”74 The GATS Carve-out exception is expressed making reference to the 
objectives (“prudential reasons), instead of specific types of measures that might affect 
commitments such as market access, different national treatment provided by the whole 
international instrument,
75 
as it happens with article 11.11 of the Additional Protocol (and 
FTAs), so the scope of regulatory action is quite large. Additionally, the “list” of measures 
for prudential reasons exposed in the GATS carve-out exception is not a “numerus clausus” 
provision, because its formulation is merely illustrative; the provision uses the expression 
“including for”76 as also happens with article 11.11.1 of the Additional Protocol (“measures 
such as”). 
 
Matsushita, Schoenbaum, Mavroidis and Hahn point out that the GATS carve-out 
exception, in contrast to the general exceptions of GATS Article XIV, where only 
‘necessary’ measures are allowed, covers not only ‘necessary’ but also ‘any’ prudential 
measures,
77 
including day-to-day measures,
78 
and for some authors like Marcheti, the term, 
financial stability in GATS’ carve-out exception might be synonymous of monetary 
stability.
79
 
 
 
 
74 
Juan Marcheti, “The GATS Prudential Carve-Out” in Financial regulation at the crossroads implications for 
supervision, institutional design and trade, Note 10 p. 282, (Panagiotis Delimatsis & Nils Herger eds 2011), 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 
75 
Ib. at 289 
76 
Id. 
77 
M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum, P. C. Mavroidis & M. Hahn, Supra note 65 at 629-630. 
78 
Id. 
79 
In line with Schinasi (2006), several analytical implications of this definition of financial system stability 
are worth highlighting. The first implication is that financial system stability is a condition sine qua non for 
the appropriate functioning of the real economy…The second implication is that the stability of the financial 
system is closely linked with monetary stability. As mentioned above, one of the basic functions of the 
financial system is to ensure that the economy’s payment system functions smoothly. This requires that fiat 
(or central bank) money –and its close substitutes, such as demand deposits and other bank accounts- can 
adequately fulfill its role as the universally accepted means of payment, unit of account and store value. In 
21  
 
We just mentioned that the GATS carve-out clause inspired texts in FTAs and the 
Additional Protocol, but also the Commercial Agreement signed by the European Union 
with Peru and Colombia, where Article 154 is entitled Prudential Carve-Out.
80 
That might 
explain why both the FTA and the Additional Protocol have made explicit what could be 
implicit regarding monetary, foreign exchange and financial policies in articles 11.11.2 to 
11.11.4 (Articles 12.10. 2 to 12.10.4 of FTA), taking also into consideration the evolution 
of international standards of Financial and Banking regulations. As quoted, Article 11.11.2 
excludes “non-discriminatory measures of general application taken by any public entity in 
pursuit of monetary and related credit or exchange rate policies,” Article 11.11.3 excludes 
limitation of transfers in order to the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or 
financial responsibility of financial institutions or cross-border financial service suppliers, 
and Article 11.11.4 clarifies that country members keep their power to adopt or enforce 
measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not inconsistent 
with this Chapter. The Commercial Agreement signed by the European Union with Peru 
and Colombia also disposes of a specific exclusion in Article 159.2 for monetary and 
related credit or exchange rate policies.
81
 
 
 
 
 
other words, financial stability and monetary stability overlap to a large extent. Marcheti, Supra note 74 at 
289 
80 
Article 154 of the Commercial Agreement signed by the European Union with Colombia and Peru has the 
following text: 
Prudential Carve-Out 
1. Notwithstanding other provisions of this Title or Title V (Current Payments and Movements of Capital), a 
Party may adopt or maintain for prudential reasons, measures such as: 
(a) the protection of investors, depositors, policy-holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a 
financial service supplier; (b) ensuring the integrity and stability of its financial system. 
2. Measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be more burdensome than necessary to achieve their aim, 
and shall not discriminate against financial services or financial service suppliers of another Party in 
comparison to its own like financial services or like financial service suppliers. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require a Party to disclose information relating to the 
affairs and accounts of individual customers or any confidential or proprietary information in the possession 
of public entities. 
4. Without prejudice to other means of prudential regulation of the cross-border supply of financial services, 
a Party may require the registration or authorization of cross-border suppliers of financial services of 
another Party and of financial instruments. 
81 
Article 159.2 of the Commercial Agreement signed by the European Union with Colombia and Peru has the 
following text: 2. Nothing in this Agreement applies to activities or measures conducted or adopted by a 
central bank or monetary, exchange rate or credit authority or by any other public entity in pursuit of 
monetary and related credit or exchange rate policies. 
22  
In the case of the second pivotal element —mutual recognition and  harmonization— 
Article 11.12 of the Additional Protocol (similar text to Article 12.3.2 to 12.3.4 of the FTA 
signed by Peru and the US) provides the following: 
 
1. In the application of measures covered by this Chapter, a Party may recognize 
prudential measures of another Party or of a non-Party. Such recognition may be: 
(a) ) accorded autonomously; 
(b) ) achieved through harmonization or other means; or 
(c) based upon an agreement or arrangement with another Party or a non-Party. 
 
 
2. A Party according recognition of prudential measures under paragraph 2 shall 
provide adequate opportunity to other Parties to demonstrate that circumstances 
exist in which there are or would be equivalent regulation, oversight, 
implementation of regulation, and, if appropriate, procedures concerning the 
sharing of information between the relevant Parties. 
3. Where a Party accords recognition of prudential measures under paragraph 2(c) 
and the circumstances set out in paragraph 3 exist, the Party shall provide 
adequate opportunity to other Parties to negotiate accession to the agreement or 
arrangement, or to negotiate a comparable agreement or arrangement. 
 
The fact that a party may recognize a prudential measure of another Party (or of a non- 
Party) implies that a regulatory decision or an implemented policy from one national 
authority will be recognized and, therefore, produce legal effects before a different national 
authority as a mechanism to facilitate the establishment and provision of financial services 
in the context of a liberalization or integration project. In both cases, recognition will be the 
result of a high level of harmonization of local regulations and policies; however, mutual 
recognition should have more possibilities to develop in a deep integration agenda as the 
Pacific Alliance, rather than in a mere trade liberalization commitment. Article 11.12 of the 
Additional Protocol, again almost mirroring FTA and UE commercial agreement models,
82
 
 
 
82 
Article 158 of the Commercial Agreement signed by the European Union with Colombia and Peru, that has 
the following text: 
Recognition of Prudential Measures 
23  
proposes the different ways in which that recognition could be reached: unilaterally, by 
either harmonization or other means and based upon an agreement. 
 
The fact that recognition facilitates market access may explain why in the NAFTA model 
this principle is provided within the article devoted to the MFN Treatment,  and  also 
justifies the obligation to provide to another party the opportunity to enjoy the same 
treatment or negotiate accession to the mutual recognition agreement or arrangement. 
Nevertheless, recognition cannot constitute a means of discrimination or a disguised 
restriction of trade… recognition is a process involving sensitive consideration of another 
country’s regulation and supervision. Therefore authors construct this as a narrow 
obligation, not imposing the same constraint as most favored nation… As long as it is 
shown that the recognition is based on criteria that are not biased towards one country or 
another and is part of an assessment procedure following due process, the recognition may 
be considered to be non-discriminatory.
83  
But we should insist on the idea that mutual 
recognition plays a pivotal role in an integration process, as illustrated by the European 
Union, with the approval and implementation of the Second Banking Directive to allow 
mutual recognition of banking regulations and “home country control” of credit institutions 
with a head office in a European member state, but with activities in other member states 
by means of cross-border supply or the establishment of branches.
84
 
 
 
1. A Party may recognize prudential measures of any other country in determining how the measures 
relating to financial services of that Party shall be applied. Such recognition, which may be achieved 
through harmonization or otherwise, may be based upon an agreement or arrangement with the 
country concerned, or may be granted autonomously. 
2. A Party that is a party to such an agreement or arrangement referred to in paragraph 1, whether 
future or existing, shall afford adequate opportunity for another Party to negotiate its accession to 
such agreements or arrangements, or to negotiate comparable ones with such Party, under 
circumstances in which there would be equivalent regulation, oversight, implementation of such 
regulation and, if appropriate, procedures concerning the sharing of information between the 
Parties to the agreement or arrangement. Where a Party accords recognition autonomously, such 
Party shall afford adequate opportunity for another Party to demonstrate that those circumstances 
exist. 
 
83 
Bart De Meester, “Liberalization of Trade in Banking Services, an International and European Perspective,” 
p. 165 (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
84 
Ibid. 271. “In addition to harmonizing some essential regulations for authorization and exercising the 
business of credit institutions, the Second Banking Directive elaborated two principles that still constitute the 
corner stone of the internal market for banking services in the EU: the principle of ‘home country control’ and 
that of ‘mutual recognition’. With respect to the first principle, the Second Banking Directive required 
prudential supervision of a credit institution to be performed by the home member state, subject to some 
exceptions where the host country could still supervise. In respect to the second principle, the Directive 
24  
 
Despite the high degree of macroeconomic convergence and the deep integration vocation, 
Pacific Alliance treaties have left the regime of mutual recognition in general terms like any 
FTA. Of course this is not a limitation for developing mechanisms of rapprochement 
towards mutual recognition (Article 11.12 of Additional Protocol refers to them), but treaty 
drafters seem to have opted for a gradual path, as mentioned in Article 3.1 (a) of the 
Framework Agreement,
85 
due to some remaining legal differences among country members 
and the natural reaction to preserve local regulatory attributions in the absence of 
supranational authorities. For example, today the region has a different treatment on 
branches and subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions; and country members do not 
have any specific rules on cross-border financial services based on regional criteria.
86 
In 
Mexico, the establishment of foreign financial institutions must be made through the 
constitution  of  subsidiaries  and  not  through  foreign  branches,  and  in  Colombia  the 
establishment of subsidiaries may be conditioned to the existence of consolidated 
supervision of the foreign parent company and the authorization of the home supervisor.
87 
By the same token, in case of liquidation of a local branch of a foreign financial institution, 
under Colombian, Peruvian and Chilean Law creditors who reside in the country are 
preferred over nonresident creditors;
88 
and the banking laws of Peru and Colombia require 
local asset maintenance to satisfy liabilities of a branch in case of insolvency of the branch 
or the parent company.
89 
In Chile, creditors of any foreign financial banks, national or 
foreign, shall have preference over assets placed in Chile.
90
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provided that a credit institution that is authorized and supervised by certain member state must be allowed by 
other member states to carry on their territory any of the banking services for which it was granted 
authorization by the home member state, as far as these services are listed in the Annex to the Directive. 
These services can be provided by means of cross-border service supply or by means of the establishment of a 
branch.” Ibid. 273 
85  “a zone of deep integration to develop progressively the free circulation of goods, services, capitals and 
persons” 
86 
L. Lorenzo & W. Bossu, Supra note 66 at 107. 
87 
Ibid.at pp 110 – 111. 
88 
Ibid. at p. 113. 
89 
Ibid, at 116. 
90 
Article 34 of D.F.L. No. 3 of 1997. 
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At this point of our analysis we wonder whether member countries of the Pacific Alliance 
are really ready to take significant steps towards deep financial integration or they prefer to 
remain in the general path of liberalization. 
 
The progressive construction of MILA can provide some signals of how member countries 
are able to go further, despite the generalities of treaty instruments and the diverse local 
treatment in some areas. MILA started in 2011 as a private sector initiative to create a 
platform of negotiation for national stock exchanges, where a Peruvian investor could buy 
Colombian or Chilean shares directly from the foreign trading platform (without the 
intervention of a Peruvian broker as mediator through a foreign broker).
91 
Today MILA has 
become  a  mechanism  that  integrates  the  four  members  of  the  Pacific  Alliance,  fully 
supported by national regulators, recognizing primary issuances authorized in each 
jurisdiction. Since 2009 financial market regulators of Colombia, Peru and Chile signed 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU)
92 
to support the MILA project; and since 2015 
member countries have included in their summit declarations explicit commitments towards 
mutual recognition. The Declaration of Paracas (2015)
93 
provided the commitment to 
modify national regulations to implement the recognition of primary issuances in any 
country member for their negotiation through the integrated platform,
94 
which is now under 
implementation as reported in the Declarations of Puerto Varas (2016)
95  
and Santiago de 
Cali (2017).
96  
Therefore, although the Framework Agreement and the Additional Protocol 
provide general rules under the model of previous FTAs, they offer possibilities for moving 
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further towards mutual recognition and regulatory harmonization. The feasibility of a 
similar development in banking regulation remains a challenge for the Pacific Alliance but, 
as mentioned before, its instruments should be approached as a point of departure rather 
than a point of arrival, after a long regional debate of some policy issues. We discuss some 
of them in the next section. 
 
 
 
II. Goals and Realities of Financial Integration 
 
 
In general, financial integration can be verified by identifying the capacity —legal and 
factual— of national economies to create financial assets and liabilities with foreign 
economies.
97 
This capacity covers cross-border capital flows, foreign participation in 
domestic markets through the establishment of branches and subsidiaries, sharing 
information and practices among financial institutions or unification of market structures.
98 
According to Article 11.2 of the Additional Protocol, the scope and coverage of Chapter 11 
on Financial Services applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: (a) 
financial institutions of another Party; (b) investors of another Party, and investments of 
such investors, in financial institutions in the Party’s territory; and (c) cross-border trade 
in financial services.
99
 
 
Financial integration must be conceived under the prism of cross-border trade for supply 
and establishment. Article 11.1 of the Additional Protocol defines cross-border trade in 
financial services or cross-border supply of financial services as the supply of a financial 
service: (a) from the territory of one Party into the territory of another Party; (b) in the 
territory of one Party by a person of that Party to a person of another Party, or (c) by a 
national of one Party in the territory of another Party; but does not include the supply of a 
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financial service in the territory of a Party by an investment in that territory.
100 
However, 
as already mentioned, there is —conceptually— a substantial difference between an 
integration process vis-à-vis mere liberalization (even though both processes share the 
prism of cross-border trade) because regulatory harmonization and mutual recognition are 
mandatory processes (definitive point of arrival) in the first case. 
 
Precisely, thinking about Latin American integration in financial services, Aguirre 
proposed in 1996 that liberalization should involve at least five fundamental freedoms: (1) 
The freedom (or right) of establishment; (2) the freedom to offer financial services 
(preferably without being required to obtain specific authorizations from host country 
authorities), (3) the freedom of users to obtain financial services (without considering the 
nationality of the supplier or its owners); (4) the absence of foreign exchange controls that 
limit the free circulation of capital; and (5) the existence of a single securities market, or at 
least sufficiently integrated and harmonized securities markets to permit cross-border 
issuance and trading of all types of securities.
101 
It is quite interesting that, taking into 
account the NAFTA experience, Aguirre envisioned how a liberalization-plus process 
should be built in Latin America, including aspects that needed an important degree of 
legislative and regulatory degree of convergence as exchange controls. He already 
emphasized that the harmonization process must be supplemented by mutual recognition in 
nonessential regulatory areas and ideally (though it may be difficult) by mechanisms that 
facilitate coordination of at least basic macroeconomic policies.
102
 
 
Considering the level of macroeconomic convergence among Pacific Alliance member 
countries, we would have expected the inclusion of —at least— some guidelines in the 
Additional Protocol regarding harmonization, mutual recognition and even the carve-out 
exception, other than the transfer of equal texts from FTAs. As in the case of the ASEAN 
agenda, which considered the creation of a Task force on the ASEAN Banking Integration 
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Framework (ABIF), some specific roadmap should be in the works to pave the way towards 
banking liberalization and integration.
103
 
 
At the same time, while up to now macroeconomic convergence has developed voluntarily 
and incidentally, a sort of mandatory harmonization under the treaty framework would have 
implied a significant degree of transfer or relinquishment of sovereign competences.
104 
Pacific Alliance instruments have been cautious in clarifying that a zone of deep 
integration will develop —progressively— the free circulation of goods, services, capitals 
and persons.
105 
In that context, we will analyze in this Section some consistency problems 
that may arise during the gradual period where harmonization, mutual recognition, carve- 
out exception and local financial stability should live together; and propose some guidelines 
for the future agenda of banking integration. 
 
a. Promoting Deeper Regulatory Harmonization 
 
 
In theory, if Pacific Alliance country members consolidate the path towards regulatory 
harmonization on prudential reasons, mutual recognition should arrive naturally. The 
problem is that there are different speeds in the alignment of international standards. One 
example is precisely the implementation of Basel III, where Chile and Colombia have taken 
a gradual approach, while Mexico and Peru have lagged somewhat.
106  
In the case of the 
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European banking integration, it would have taken decades if the process had not placed 
mutual recognition in parallel.
107
 
 
In any case, regulatory harmonization becomes a necessity when a mutual recognition 
agreement is in the explicit horizon of the integration project, as has already happened with 
the MILA. In fact, the alignment to international standards —a priori— does not constitute 
an obstacle to trade. Before the approval of the Tokyo Round in 1969, the Committee on 
Trade in Industrial products decided to establish a working group with the purpose of 
examining the diverse scenarios in which standards can act as obstacles to trade and 
proposing possible solutions.
108
 
 
The ASEAN program for regional financial integration was born from the existing 
standards in international financial law.
109 
A full banking integration, such as the one 
governed by the “single passport” system in the European Union, would be too ambitious 
for ASEAN for the next ten years. Instead, member countries proposed steps for partial 
banking integration over a ten year period with different timelines for each individual 
ASEAN member state. This is to be supported by an institutional approach based on 
regulatory harmonization and the strengthening of policy coordination among the ASEAN 
member states, in line with the principles set out in the 2008 AEC Blueprint.
110
The strategy 
includes: (1) a two-track approach whereby states should start phasing out most of the 
 
 
107 
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 64 Harv. Int'l L.J. 55, 108 (2011) 
108 
Humberto Zúñiga Schroder, “Harmonization, Equivalence and Mutual Recognition of Standards in WTO 
Law, pp. 2-3 (Wolters Kluwer) 2011. One of the ‘solutions’ discussed in this working group was a “code of 
Conduct on Preventing Technical Barriers to Trade’ which later developed into the Tokyo Round Standards 
Code. The objective of this code was to ensure that standards, both mandatory and voluntary… are not 
formulated or applied in such a way as to cause unjustifiable obstacles to international trade’. To achieve this 
objective, the Code required adherents to use ‘as a basis for their standards relevant international 
standards’. An initial draft of the proposed Code (concluded in December 1971) contained two important 
definitions: firstly, ‘harmonization’, as the process of making the standards of different countries or 
organizations the same as regards their content although their layout and format may differ.’ Secondly, 
‘equivalence’ of test methods (subsequently broadened to SPS measures and TBT technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures), which involved the acceptance of test methods imposed by 
a particular country, provided that such methods offer an assurance of conformity with applicable standards 
equivalent to the procedures carried out by the country of destination. References to these two concepts were 
also included in the Tokyo Round Standards Code, albeit with some differences regarding the scope of 
‘equivalence’ which now encompasses ‘self-certification, test results, certificates or marks of conformity’. Id. 
109 
Hector Danny D. Uy, “ASEAN's Legal Framework on Financial Integration,” 89 Phil. L.J. 257- 259 
(2015). 
110 
Geert Almekinders, Satoshi Fukuda, Alex Mourmouras, Jianping Zhou, Supra note 10 at 15. 
30  
remaining restrictions on wholesale banking, while delaying the completion of the 
liberalization of cross-border retail banking (deposit-taking); and (b) a three-dimensional 
framework (equal access, equal treatment, and equal environment) to guide the  long 
process of financial services liberalization in ASEAN.
111 
In that context the harmonization 
of banking regulations should start with the licensing requirements and extend to cover (i) 
bank accounting standards and disclosure requirements; (ii) minimum capital 
requirements; (iii) risk management; (iv) prompt corrective action (PCA) and resolution 
methods for failed banks; (v) restrictions on large exposure; and (vi) anti-money 
laundering and consumer protection regulations.
112
 
 
With the level of macroeconomic convergence of country members and their engagement 
in international organizations that play the role of standard creators, it is possible to find 
some areas of financial regulation that are highly harmonized and other that are less so. 
Therefore it may be a priority to map and monitor the level of compliance of international 
standards,
113 
taking advantage of international mechanisms already in place such as the 
IMF Article IV consultations, the FSAP assessments under and the Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).
114 
Even though total harmonization is 
impossible due to physical and policy differences between countries,
115 
a reasonable level 
of regulatory convergence (duly monitored) may be completed by mutual recognition. 
 
b. Mutual Recognition vis-à-vis the Carve-out Exception 
 
 
Mutual recognition implies that a regulatory decision or a policy from one national 
authority will be recognized in another jurisdiction, while the carve-out exception 
guarantees that any local measure related to prudential reasons, as well as monetary and 
other related credit or exchange policies will remain immune from the integration 
commitments.  Therefore,  mutual  recognition  and  the  carve-out  exception  seem  to  be 
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opposed to each other. Nevertheless, both principles are recognized in liberalization 
schemes (multilateral, regional and bilateral), under the idea that the carve-out exception by 
definition should not be an anti-trade mechanism. What happens is that, even if countries 
keep the capacity to adopt measures for prudential reasons or seek to implement monetary 
and related credit or exchange rate policies, when they reach a deep level of convergence of 
prudential requirements and policies they will be ready to recognize (by agreement) their 
local licenses and authorizations. 
 
The problem is that, if there is no incentive or a political decision for regulatory 
harmonization, the inertia to keep financial matters under the local sphere as part of 
sovereign attributes, will be well protected by the carve-out exception. The fact that today 
there is a trend in local financial regulators to follow international standards like those 
created by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the IOSCO or the IAIS does not 
assure full compliance or a simultaneous alignment, because these mechanisms —in 
general— are not binding,116 but remain as soft-law commitments rather than formal treaty 
obligations.
117 
Cottiers and Krajewski precisely propose that the GATS traditional model of 
trade liberalization and regulation implies that liberalization is achieved through 
international commitments and binding rules, while regulation, left to the domestic level 
and without a mandatory command to harmonize.
118
 
 
In addition, Marcheti points out that the capacity to adopt prudential measures, without 
breaching international trade commitments, is considerable because the carve-out exception 
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does not refer to prudential regulations but to prudential “reasons.” It does not restrict the 
freedom of regulatory authorities with respect to the type of measures that can be 
applied…Rather its focus is on the objectives or the underlying reasons, rather than on the 
instruments used in pursuance of those objectives.
119 
However, that capacity is not totally 
open-ended 
120 
if we consider that GATS, FTAs, and the Additional Protocol mandate that 
prudential measures should not be applied in a discriminatory way. Prudential measures 
must be designed on the basis of prudential parameters where the quality of the supervision 
applied in the jurisdiction of origin of the service and service supplier, assessed in 
objective terms, does play a role, but they are not meant to discriminate between financial 
institutions merely on the grounds of their nationality.
121
 
 
If the carve-out exception may not necessarily have an anti-trade approach, it cannot be a 
full element of financial integration, as in the case of mutual recognition. In general, mutual 
recognition agreements reduce the cost of exports, facilitate trade,
122 
and constitute a 
significant step towards financial integration and one of the most widespread instruments of 
cooperation between financial regulatory instruments.
123 
But again, mutual recognition is 
only likely to be a viable option when states reveal comparable development and financial 
regulation.
124 
We have already mentioned that the EU history of the completion of an 
internal market was characterized by minimum harmonization of banking law to enable 
mutual   recognition   of   banking   regulations   and   home   country   control   of   credit 
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institutions.
125 
According to these principles founded in the Second Directive, the 
authorization for a financial institution to operate in a EU country member is enough for the 
institution to open branches, or supply financial services, leaving in EU countries of origin 
prudential supervision, but based on essential harmonization of access to banking activity, 
capital requirements, solvency ratios, limitations on risk concentration in lending, and 
standardization of accounting procedures, among others.
126 
However mutual recognition 
does not require full harmonization; it covers some differences under the understanding 
(assessment) that home state’s regulation is “equivalent” or comparable to that of the 
state, and vice versa,
127 
and it goes beyond national treatment because private actors can 
operate in the host state while complying only with the regulatory requirements of their 
home state.
128
 
 
From previous experience, a deep financial integration project, as announced by the Pacific 
Alliance instruments, should combine an essential degree of regulatory harmonization — 
duly monitored by a supranational mechanism— with the explicit goal of according mutual 
recognition, even if some regulatory differences remain.
129 
It will definitively be necessary 
to create a regional mechanism in the Pacific Alliance to follow the harmonization process 
and assure it developed sufficiently for extending mutual recognition. For Verdier, this 
process requires detailed rules and expert monitoring and enforcement after the European 
experience, where EU institutions played a major role, noting that outside Europe, 
establishing institutions capable of fulfilling the same functions solely for the purpose of 
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supporting mutual recognition in financial services is unlikely to be cost-effective.
130 
For 
that reason, if Pacific Alliance country members take seriously the goal of regional 
financial integration, it will be decisive to go beyond FTA liberalization standards and 
create ad hoc schemes to produce a credible harmonization process. We have already 
mentioned MILA and developments within ASEAN in this regard, but it is also very 
interesting to consider the progress achieved by the Transatlantic Economic Integration, 
where in 2007, the U.S. and EU leaders included mutual recognition in securities 
regulations as part of their goals.
131
 
 
c. Financial Stability and Financial Integration 
 
 
Global banking competition has brought benefits to consumers and helped to start 
modernization
132 
and de-concentration of financial systems in Latin America. It is true that 
financial systems the Pacific Alliance countries remain highly concentrated. In Peru, the 
three largest banks account for about 70 percent of bank assets (50 percent in Mexico, 
Colombia, and Chile).
133 
Additionally, a greater connection to the global economy through 
all kinds of cross-border transactions may also amplify an intrinsic contagion and spillover 
risk. Thus, even if there is a consensus that competition in the banking sector increases 
efficiency in channeling funds from savers to investors,
134 
some authors stress that financial 
crises have followed capital account liberalization processes in Mexico (1994), East Asia 
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(1997), and Russia (1998).
135 
This duality of today’s financial globalization has underlined 
the explicit responsibility of local regulators to assure national financial stability vis-à-vis 
external shocks and the concerns about the impact and risks of cross-border transactions 
over national financial stability at the macro level. Today it is common practice to promote 
global regulatory cooperation, consolidated supervision, and the adoption of capital and 
liquidity standards under Basel I, II and III.
136
 
 
The problem is that, while local financial stability and international trade of services go 
hand-in-hand, in extreme cases protectionist reactions have emerged, like the adoption of 
regulations that provide liquidity support to domestic but not to foreign financial 
institutions;
137 
but it is even more significant that risks created by capital flows can be 
magnified by gaps in countries’ financial and institutional infrastructure. Capital flow 
liberalization is generally more beneficial and less risky if countries have reached certain 
levels or thresholds of financial and institutional development.
138
 
 
In fact, neither the GATS nor FTAs limit financial regulatory action (as shown by the 
carve-out exception); nor the multilateral system provides binding rules on financial 
stability. Therefore, there is a real risk of disconnection between market access rules and 
financial regulations at the multilateral level, which can be reproduced in regional systems 
like the Pacific Alliance (which has the explicit goal to integrate financial markets). Once 
again, this disconnection is reinforced by the fact that Pacific Alliance instruments have 
reproduced FTA texts under the NAFTA model, without including any guideline or 
peculiarity about to the integration project. Thus, it will be necessary to find the right 
balance between liberalization and regulation of financial markets in an appropriate 
atmosphere of harmonized and monitored local regulations. 
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According to Bart de Meester, if GATS or European principles on free movement of 
services implied a limitation on national authorities to regulate financial markets, the 
objective of preserving financial stability would be threatened. This would be equivalent to 
a situation where GATS or EU law were not able to prevent the creation of barriers to trade 
banking services, thereby threatening the objective of increasing efficiency in the banking 
sector.
139 
In fact, local financial stability and market access of foreign banking services can 
become opposite goals in the absence of a coordination or supranational scheme. In this 
regard, it is useful to examine the different approaches adopted by local supervisors 
regarding cross-border transactions of foreign banks’ subsidiaries and branches. The 
supervisor of the country where the bank has been authorized (home country) will be 
concerned about the soundness of the parent bank, since a failure of the parent will affect 
the economy in the country of the supervisor. Nevertheless, the activities of the branches 
and  subsidiaries  of  the  parent  in  other  countries  are  of  relevance  for  the  home 
supervisor.
140  
In fact, the distinction between cross-border banking transactions by means 
of branches (and mere cross-border supply) and by means of subsidiaries is quite relevant 
in this respect.
141 
We have seen previously that Mexico requires that the establishment of 
foreign banks should be made through the constitution of subsidiaries (to diminish the 
effects from a potential liquidation of the foreign parent company) and several Latin 
American countries maintain measures that, while increasing the cost of cross-border 
operations, are fully appropriate in light of the imperative to maintain financial stability
142 
In fact, these types of regulations do not fit well in the context of an integrated or common 
banking market, as they respond to the unilateral approach of each local supervisor. 
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where national financial stability prevailed over the home country control model that had 
forced Iceland to protect its foreign bank customers. The Court ruled in favor of Iceland, 
concluding that extending its responsibility to include protection of foreign depositors when 
the depositor protection scheme is illiquid would jeopardize domestic financial stability. 
The economic rationale was that, by transferring the liabilities from the private sector to 
the state, a banking crisis would soon turn into a sovereign debt crisis.
143 
Even considering 
the special status of Iceland within the European Union,
144 
this case shows that an attempt 
to protect domestic stability may undermine financial integration principles.
145  
However, 
these conflicting circumstances are more understandable in FTAs where the goal is 
liberalization rather than integration. Neither the GATS nor FTAs have binding rules on 
financial stability or financial harmonization. The GATS prohibits market access 
restrictions or the adoption of discriminatory measures (it only determines what WTO 
members cannot do) and encourages mutual recognition.
146
 
 
As has been extensively explained, the carve-out exception is the treaty vehicle that permits 
the GATS, FTAs, and Pacific Alliance instruments to impose local measures for prudential 
reasons (including non-discriminatory measures in pursuit of monetary and related credit or 
exchange rate policies). Prudential reasons are not listed in treaties, but expressed as 
examples, considering that the corresponding measures are not static: they evolve with the 
continuing  transformation  of  financial  markets.
147   
In  fact  some  WTO  members  have 
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expressed the need to clarify the disciplines affected and specifically whether it covers 
those adopted to strengthen the stability of the financial system.
148
 
 
In sum, what Lupo-Pasini qualifies as dangerous is the separation between market access 
and domestic policies, and the general exclusion of financial policies from international 
legal scrutiny
149 
in the context of the multilateral system. Cottier and Krajewski are even 
more explicit, suggesting that applying sound prudential standards and thus contributing to 
the stability of the global financial system is not recognized as a commitment in return for 
which Members may obtain reciprocal benefits in terms of market access in goods and 
services of particular interest to them. Could and should the de-linking of Geneva and 
Basel be overcome?
150 
The European Union resolved this potential regulatory conflict by 
according the European Council (since the Maastricht Treaty) the power to attribute explicit 
competences to the European Central Bank (ECB) on prudential matters.
151 
This was 
effectively used after the financial crisis, placing the ECB at the center of macro-prudential 
policy. Under the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation,
152 
the ECB is responsible for 
adopting macro prudential measures.
153
 
 
Cottier and Krajewski highlight the fact that cornerstone principles of contemporary 
international trade law, such as the MFN and national treatment principles, are hardly 
mentioned in the current international financial system. The IMF and the BIS operate 
basically under soft law mechanisms and not under those anti-discriminatory principles;
154
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and the GATS does not require explicitly that prudential measures be applied on a non- 
discriminatory basis, even though they should not be used as a means of avoiding 
members’ commitments and obligations.155 This circumstance can be precisely explained 
by the tendency to leave financial stability still in the hands of national competence and 
subject to general principles. 
 
The potential conflict between market access principles and local financial stability 
regulations, in the context of the goal of financial integration, should be necessarily 
addressed as part of the agenda of regulatory cooperation of the Pacific Alliance. In fact, 
the apparent dilemma between local and global financial stability
156 
may be faced via an 
integration approach for finding a balance between regulation and liberalization of financial 
services, such as the European Union is searching for. Since the Treaty of Rome of 1957…, 
the EU has combined liberalization (negative integration) with re-regulation of the banking 
sector by means of the approximation of laws (positive integration). At the international 
level, liberalization and possible regulatory convergence are spread over different 
international bodies (De Meester)
157
 
 
d. Focusing the Agenda for Financial Integration 
 
 
As emphasized throughout this article, the construction of a zone of deep integration to 
develop progressively the free circulation of goods, services, capitals, and persons 
constitutes the basic peculiarity of the Pacific Alliance, which differs from the liberalization 
and market access commitments already provided at the multilateral and bilateral level 
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(GATT, GATS, FTAs and commercial agreements). However, this mark of difference 
needs to be developed through some specific actions at the treaty and local level, 
specifically in the area of financial integration. It will be necessary to reinforce the 
institutional and macroeconomic convergence already reached, consolidate the practice of 
regulatory cooperation and explore the possibility of some kind of supranational 
mechanism, which is not alien to Latin American countries in areas such as international 
human rights. Let us summarize some considerations for the future negotiation agenda. 
 
Reinforcement of institutional and macroeconomic convergence: One of the essential pillars 
of the Pacific Alliance is the deep level of macroeconomic convergence already achieved 
among members who share similar approaches to liberalization and open market economy. 
This converging reality needs to be visible and reflected in instruments geared to reinforce 
the raison d´être of the project and its own legitimacy. The Preamble of the Framework 
Agreement expresses members’ willingness to make of the Pacific Alliance “a space of 
agreement and convergence as well as a mechanism of political dialogue”158 and Article 3 
considers among its objectives to become “a platform of political articulation.”159 A simple 
mechanism for putting into immediate practice the declarations and political mandates in a 
way that is not merely rhetorical is reporting periodically through the Pacific Alliance 
website the evolution of macroeconomic convergence and the compliance of international 
financial standards. This sole transparency practice would contribute to monitoring the 
convergence process already in place by governments and local regulators; and providing to 
individuals and markets a real perception of the Alliance’s potential and possibilities for 
evolving in different comparative and free controlling mechanisms. 
 
The Pacific Alliance could consolidate comparative statistical information and reports from 
local regulators, international organizations and soft law creators related to main 
macroeconomic figures and the compliance of international standards. A global perspective 
and open scrutiny of each member country’s information on IMF article IV reports, Basel 
standards, and measures for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, among 
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others, would offer a realistic perspective of the integration process; and, as in other 
experiences like the European Union, will contribute to building domestic political agendas 
and attracting the participation of other components of society (academia, civil society, and 
professional associations) to the discussion and construction of the integration process. In 
short, the implementation of a simple transparency practice (i.e., consolidating information 
that is already in the public domain) can contribute considerably to gaining legitimacy and 
encouraging participation in the process. 
 
Another way to reinforce the convergence already achieved is consecrating the institutional 
convergence on central bank independence and fiscal responsibility —recognized by all 
Pacific Alliance members— at the treaty level. Achieving this legal (and eventually 
constitutional) element will be more complex than our first proposal. However, the idea is 
not creating either a common currency nor a regional central bank, but establishing —in the 
Framework Agreement— the principle of central bank independence and the basic 
elements of fiscal responsibility and transparency already provided by local legislation. The 
treaty’s recognition of those principles and elements will generate a stronger commitment 
for economic stability in the region and reinforce long-term predictability at the intra- and 
extra-regional level. For the implementation of this proposal, a fine analysis will be 
necessary of constitutional and legal provisions in each member country, in order  to 
identify the best possible enunciation of treaty commitments in these areas and facilitate 
negotiations. It is quite important to consider that central bank independence and consistent 
economic policies (where fiscal policy today is essential part of State policies) are already 
constitutive elements of the so called Economic Constitution
160 
which, far from implying a 
absolutist sovereign competences, guarantee the compliance of economic principles in 
favour of the exercise of citizens’ economic rights. 
 
Regulatory cooperation: In the same line of thought of macroeconomic and institutional 
convergence, regulatory coordination should support the harmonization process already in 
place in financial, banking and prudential regulation; and it is advisable to explore the 
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possibility of developing this dynamics in new areas, such as monetary and foreign 
exchange policies. It is more than evident that not only in finance, but also in trade and 
investment, the degree of integration of Pacific Alliance members is not comparable to the 
European Union
161 
to the point of justifying common monetary and foreign exchange 
policies. However, The Pacific Alliance can be another valuable space to exchange policy 
experiences, as it is already the case in different international and regional forums such as 
in the IMF, the BIS, the Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos (CEMLA), and 
in general all soft-law organizations. 
 
Among some specific subjects on prudential and banking regulation that should be 
addressed in next agendas is the discussion of common rules on the establishment of banks 
from Pacific Alliance countries [consistency with FTAs already signed], consolidated 
surveillance of banks established in the region, and cross-border financial services. Another 
priority that deserves a special place is to start the discussions for defining the roadmap 
towards a mutual recognition agreement. 
 
IMF recommendations: As already mentioned, the IMF, through preparatory documents, 
working papers, and comparative research, has been insisting on the need for Latin 
America, and specifically the Pacific Alliance, to be seriously engaged in financial 
integration, with some specific recommendations still under discussion. In the context of 
this contribution, it is worth mentioning some related specifically to the banking sector. For 
Latin America in general, besides the explicit recommendation to explore opportunities for 
mutual recognition of licensing, the IMF suggests that all banks have access to credit 
bureaus and deposit insurance, countries harmonize accounting and regulatory frameworks, 
through consistent implementation of IFRS, timely adoption of a consistent capital 
definition as articulated by Basel 3 and Solvency II-type regimes, enhance consolidated 
supervision of all banking groups, expand supervisory and resolution colleges to cover all 
regional banks with significant cross-border activity, enhance conglomerate supervision, 
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and establish regulatory limits for intra-group exposures within banking groups, and 
between bank and non-bank parts of conglomerates, and develop explicit, open, objective 
and non-discriminatory statutory and regulatory framework for entry of foreign financial 
institutions. 
162
 
 
For the Pacific Alliance, the IMF proposes the establishment of a small Secretariat to 
prepare and disseminate a comprehensive framework for integration, including timelines 
and sequencing, to align the political and technical agendas, maintain integration 
momentum, ensure consistency, and gain the benefits of proceeding through reciprocity.
163 
This is interesting, as in many instances Pacific Alliance countries have stressed the fact 
that the institutional framework of the Alliance should remain informal and straightforward, 
in contrast with other experiences where the construction of regional bureaucracies has 
produced endless discussions. In fact, it is time to reinforce the reliability of the integration 
process of the Pacific Alliance through some level of centralized monitoring. In this regard, 
it is reasonable to consider creating a small technical unit capable of enhancing the process; 
otherwise, the process will be determined by the differing paces of progress of local 
legislators and regulators. A specific IMF regulatory suggestion for the Pacific Alliance 
refers to the progressive harmonization of safety nets as regards to bank deposit insurance 
and investor protection, with the possible development of common funds. 
 
At some point, the experience of economic integration will likely make Pacific Alliance 
countries realize the need to enforce common economic rules, principles and policies. 
Specifically, it will be necessary to jump from soft to hard law and imagine some sort of 
supranational regulatory coordination. However, this process should arrive naturally, once 
regulatory harmonization and actual financial integration have become substantial. 
However, countries should start making progress towards this possibility through 
continuing  practice  of  regulatory  coordination  and  exchange  of  experiences.  In  fact, 
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supranational mechanisms are not alien to Latin America, if we consider the consolidation 
of the Inter-American Human Rights System, in place during the last 50 years and evolving 
towards new areas, such as economic rights (FTAs, CAN, and other experiences). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Pacific Alliance member countries have reached such a level of macroeconomic stability 
and convergence (even before the formal constitution of the alliance) that it is reasonable to 
expect new forms of economic and institutional evolution in the region. In light of other 
experiences like the European Union, a likely path is building a deep financial integration 
area, as generally enunciated in treaty instruments (in fact a necessity, due to the 
withdrawal of major global banks from the region). However, there are no explicit 
provisions or guidelines for the commitment of financial integration, because most articles 
in the Framework Agreement and Additional Protocol mirror FTA texts under the NAFTA 
model (following FTA agreements signed by member countries with the U.S.). The real 
challenge for the Alliance is to unleash those energies and commitments towards financial 
integration that remain implicit in texts and deserve an extensive work of harmonization 
and regulatory coordination. Financial integration is not a mere liberalization and market 
access code that is being replicated at the bilateral level; it is in fact part of a major project 
to consolidate an area of regional integration. Harmonization of prudential rules, mutual 
recognition and financial stability principles designed with a regional approach are basic 
elements of future agendas that should be complemented with a decisive effort to bring to 
the treaty level the institutional convergence on central bank independence and fiscal 
responsibility. 
